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Abstract  
This case study examines the relevance of taking social and political factors into 
consideration when a corporation is making a key business decision. In September 2009, 
Simon Beresford-Wylie, the outgoing CEO of Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN), was 
reviewing the company’s achievements — while acknowledging the latest public criticism 
regarding NSN’s business relationship with the Iranian government. In the summer of 2009, 
NSN was accused of complicity in human rights violations linked to Iran’s presidential 
election. The company sold network infrastructure and software solutions to the Iranian 
government, which then used this technology to observe, block, and control domestic 
communications. Should NSN have acted differently?  
 Students are asked to examine the economic and moral arguments for and against 
selling products to an oppressive regime that might then use those products to violate human 
rights. In such a case, does the corporation bear co-responsibility for human rights violations 
committed by an oppressive regime? 
 
Keywords: censorship, complicity, human rights, corporate social responsibility, Nokia 
Siemens Networks  
 
2 
September 2009 
For more than two years, Simon Beresford-Wylie had served as Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN). In October, Rajeev Suri was poised to 
replace Beresford-Wylie as NSN’s new CEO. During his final working days at NSN, 
Beresford-Wylie reflected on the company’s achievements during his stint as CEO, but also 
acknowledged the latest public criticism concerning NSN’s business relationship with the 
Iranian government (Lake, 2009).  
Beresford-Wylie recalled the Wall Street Journal article titled “Iran’s Web Spying 
Aided By Western Technology” (Rhoads and Chao, 2009). The article gave details about the 
company’s 2008 transaction with the Iranian government involving the sale of so-called 
“monitoring centers” that enabled the Iranian government to observe, block, and control 
communications such as telephone calls and short messages.  
Following the Wall Street Journal article, several other articles and publications 
reported on NSN’s business with Iran, alleging that the company had sold a spy system (Lake, 
2009). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and activists subsequently criticized NSN’s 
dealings with the Iranian government and argued that the company was an accomplice to the 
regime’s human rights violations. In particular, NGOs and activists claimed that “Neda’s1 
blood sticks on Nokia products” (Tomik, 2009) and referred to NSN as “a handyman of 
dictatorship” (Hartmann et al., 2009). Boycotts of Nokia and Siemens products followed 
(Kamali Dehghan, 2009).  
Beresford-Wylie recalled the transaction in detail. The decision had been made. But 
now that he saw the consequences, the outgoing CEO wondered whether his company — or 
he — should have done things differently.  
 
Simon Beresford-Wylie2 
3 
Beresford-Wylie studied economic geography and history at the Australian National 
University and completed an Executive Development Program offered jointly by Stanford 
University and the National University of Singapore. Before joining private industry, he 
worked for the Australian government on taxation and industry policy. In 1989, Beresford-
Wylie joined the private sector and had worked there since, holding various senior 
management positions.  
Before joining Nokia in 1998, Beresford-Wylie served as CEO of Indian mobile 
operator Modi Telstra. At Nokia, he held various senior positions, such as Managing Director 
of Nokia Networks in India, the head of Nokia’s infrastructure business group, and Senior 
Vice President of Customer Operations for Nokia Networks. Overall, his positions, both in 
Asia and Europe, involved close customer contact.  
In 2007, Beresford-Wylie was promoted to CEO of NSN. On the company’s Web site, 
the new CEO was described as follows: “Simon is a results-oriented business leader with a 
passion for the industry, the customer and execution excellence. He has built a reputation as a 
strong leader, people manager and communicator. He holds the Nokia Siemens Networks 
values dearly and is committed to steering the company and its people towards the goal of 
becoming the world’s most visionary and customer-dedicated enabler of communications 
services.”  
 
Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN) 
A 50:50 joint venture between mobile communications equipment manufacturer Nokia 
and electrical equipment giant Siemens, NSN started operations in April 2007. Nokia was a 
world leader in the mobile communications sector. The corporation’s product and service 
portfolio included mobile phones, equipment, and solutions for businesses and consumers, 
plus imaging, game, and media applications. It sold equipment, solutions, and services to 
network operators and corporations alike (Nokia Homepage, n.d.).  
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Meanwhile, Siemens’ product offers spanned information and communications, 
automation and control, power, transportation, medical devices, and lighting. The German 
company was a global powerhouse in electrical engineering and electronics (Siemens 
Homepage, n.d.). NSN combined Nokia’s network business group with Siemens’ 
communications carrier-related expertise. Siemens retained a non-controlling financial 
interest while Nokia handled day-to-day business operations.  
The joint venture produced one of the world’s biggest telecommunications 
infrastructure companies. Headquartered in Espoo, Finland, in 2008 NSN’s net sales totalled 
15.3 billion euros (Nokia Siemens Networks, n.d.). Over 1.5 billion people connected through 
NSN networks: the company boasted the number two position worldwide in wireless 
networks and operator services. NSN operated in more than 150 countries with some 60,000 
employees serving 600 customers.  
NSN clients included communications service providers (CSPs), governments, and 
businesses. CSPs are public or private corporations that deliver information electronically. 
Examples include wireless telecommunications operators and Internet service providers such 
as Orange, T-Mobile, and Vodafone. NSN provided CSPs with technology and infrastructure 
that enable data transport and communication, including microwave antennas, repeater 
stations, and satellite links. In short, NSN furnished the infrastructure that made Internet and 
mobile communications possible. 
NSN offered a comprehensive service and product portfolio, including mobile, fixed, 
and hybrid network infrastructure solutions. The company provided hardware and software 
components for voice, data, and mobile network communications.  
Specifically, it provided CSPs with infrastructure that enables wireless and mobile 
telecommunication transfers. Its software solutions encompassed products that inspect, 
analyze, and manage mobile voice and data traffic. The software packages allowed service 
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operators to observe, control, and manage data flow and improve network efficiency. The 
software could also be used for Web censorship, Internet filtering, and data inspection. 
Because the Internet can be used as a vehicle for criminal activities such as child 
pornography or terrorism, certain legal regulations and standards allow “lawful interception.” 
Software with control capabilities can be used to prohibit child pornography, locate terrorists, 
or fight corruption and money laundering. Several standards bodies, such as the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the 3rd Generation Partnership Project, and 
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)3 provide guidelines 
regarding lawful interception. In the European Union, lawful interception capabilities are 
required, forcing corporations such as NSN to provide relevant technology to network 
operators when selling network products and services. NSN’s term for its lawful interception 
software is “monitoring center.” NSN’s monitoring centers can enable Internet service 
providers to monitor voice and/or data transmissions, depending on how the system is set up.  
 
Market Competition  
The telecommunications market had two noteworthy characteristics: First, the mobile 
and Internet communications sectors were highly promising. Emerging markets and rapid 
broadband Internet and mobile network diffusion were key drivers of this growth (Business 
Insights Ltd., 2008a). Demand for sophisticated networks was high not only in Western 
nations but in emerging countries as well. Latin America, India, and Iran held special growth 
potential, as all wanted to improve wireless and mobile connectivity (Business Insights Ltd., 
2008a).  
Second, in recent years telecommunications sector competition had intensified due to 
rapid technological changes. NSN’s competitors included Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, Cisco 
Systems, and Huawei. Competition was particularly severe from Chinese vendors such as 
Huawei (Business Insights Ltd., 2008b). Asian and Chinese vendors enjoyed government 
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funding and could therefore undercut average industry prices. Due to fierce price competition, 
each competitor was eager to win new business. This was the case for NSN, too, when in 
2008 it closed its deal with the Iranian government to expand the country’s mobile network. 
 
Nokia Siemens Networks and the Iranian Government 
Since NSN’s founding, the company had enjoyed business relationships with many 
governments, including Iran’s. The Iranian government wanted to expand the nation’s 
wireless and mobile networks, and approached NSN with a request to provide the necessary 
equipment, infrastructure components, and upgrades. In the course of the transaction, NSN 
provided TCI, a state-controlled Iranian communications operator, with lawful intercept 
software that enabled TCI to monitor conversations conducted with both mobile and landline 
telephones.  
 Telecommunication suppliers were legally obliged to provide CSPs with lawful 
intercept capability. These legal regulations were in force in most Western countries as well 
as in Iran. Moreover, such requirements were described in internationally recognized 
standards such as ETSI and CALEA. Such control and monitoring devices enabled 
government customers fight crime: The voice and data monitoring capability, for instance, 
could help identify and capture terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals, such as providers 
of child pornography. The monitoring center could therefore be used for socially desirable 
purposes.  
NSN’s provision of lawful intercept capability to the state-controlled operator TCI 
drew public attention in the summer of 2009 following the controversial Iranian presidential 
election. Critics claimed the technology supported government censorship and illicit control 
over citizen communications. 
 
Iran’s Political Regime 
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In 1979, the Iranian Revolution ended the monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, who had long been criticized by the Iranian clergy for his pro-Western policies and 
warm relationship with the United States. The conservative spiritual leader Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, who had led the revolution, proclaimed the nation the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and became its Supreme Leader. As Supreme Leader, Khomeini wielded ultimate 
political and religious power within Iran. The Supreme Leader, for example, made key 
political and judicial appointments including military commanders, National Security Council 
members, the chief judge, and half the members of the Guardian Council, who had legislative 
as well as executive powers. The Guardian Council approved not only laws but presidential 
election candidates. While the president of Iran was the highest publicly elected political 
official, he remained subordinate to the Supreme Leader. The president’s primary 
responsibility was to implement Iran’s constitution. As head of the executive branch, he was, 
for example, in charge of signing treaties, budget planning, and national employment affairs. 
But he lacked complete control over foreign policy, the military, and other issues (BBC News, 
n.d.). The Supreme Leader was the final decision maker in areas of security, defense, and 
foreign policy (Amnesty International, 2009). 
The post-revolution era was marked by international tension (BBC News, 2005a), 
conflicts (Iran-Iraq war) (BBC News, 2005b), and anti-Western (largely anti-U.S.) policies 
(CBC News, 2009). The cleric Ali Hoseini Khamenei succeeded Khomeini following 
Khomeini’s death in 1989, and was serving as Iran’s Supreme Leader by the time NSN started 
doing business in Iran. He continued Khomeini’s opposition to the West and to the United 
States in particular.  
After a conservative presidency lasting nearly twenty years, the reformist Mohammad 
Khatami became Iran’s president in 1997. During his governance, Khatami tended to support 
freedom of expression, tolerance, and civil society, which led to tensions between his 
government and the conservative clergy. Anti-government protests resulted, and in the 2005 
8 
presidential election, many reformist candidates were banned and the conservative hard-line 
candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won.  
 Despite the reformist interlude, Iranian policy has remained largely dominated by the 
clergy and conservatives. The Supreme Leader’s power was undeniable. The U.S.-based 
Committee to Protect Journalists referred to Khamenei as one of the “ten worst enemies of the 
press and freedom of expression” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000). Khamenei was 
considered the driving force behind media censorship and control in Iran.  
 
Censorship and Control in Iran 
Censorship, anchored in Iran’s constitution and the 1989 Press Law and its 
amendments, had a long tradition in Iran. According to the country’s constitution, 
publications must not “violate Islamic principles or the civil code” (Mackey, 2009). The 1986 
Press Law provided further publication guidelines. The press had to “advance the objectives 
of Iran, counteract internal division among citizens, propagate Islamic culture and principles, 
and reject manifestations or imperialistic culture as well as foreign politics and economic 
politics” (OpenNet Initiative, 2005, p. 8). Publishers were required to acquire licenses from 
the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. Government control extended to regulating 
publication names and publishing timetables. The overarching mantra was that publications 
needed to serve the best interests of the community and never “violate Islamic principles and 
codes and public rights” (OpenNet Initiative, 2005, p. 9).  
Media content was monitored by the Supreme National Security Council. Regulatory 
restrictions applied to topics such as religion, morals, national security, politics, and anti-
revolutionary activity. The Council furnished publishers with a list of banned subjects 
(Feuilherade, 2002; Reporters Sans Frontières, 2004). While some independent newspapers 
continued to operate, their numbers were diminishing. Many newspapers applied self-
censorship to avoid sanctions. Violations were reported and referred to a special press court.  
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The Iranian government sought to control television broadcasts as well. Satellite 
dishes, for instance, were officially forbidden. The government frequently blocked foreign 
television broadcasts, as in 2003 when U.S. television channels were blocked (Carter, 2003). 
While the Press Law had initially applied to print media, radio transmissions, and television 
broadcasts, the surging use — and importance — of Internet communications caused the 
Iranian government’s censorship to gradually extend to this media channel as well.  
 
Internet Censorship 
The Middle East, and Iran in particular, was experiencing a tremendous increase in 
Internet usage. In 2001, Iran had approximately one million Internet users, but by 2009 this 
number had swelled to over 30 million, representing nearly half of Iran’s population (Internet 
World Stats, n.d.). In 2009, the OpenNet Initiative estimated Iran’s annual Internet user 
growth rate at 48 percent, and nearly 2,000 cybercafés were operating in Tehran alone, the 
nation’s capital (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). The Internet had become a crucial information 
resource and communication channel, and the most trusted media platform, for Iran’s 
population. Blogs were frequently used and growing tremendously in both number and 
credibility.  
When Internet access first became available in Iran, the Internet was essentially an 
uncontrolled communication medium. This had enabled independent, uncensored publications 
and opposing viewpoints to spread. Iranian expatriates, for example, had used the Internet to 
publish their views on the Iranian government and its politics. The Internet’s growing 
popularity, however, did not go unnoticed by the Iranian government. In 2001, the 
government started censoring online dissension, including bloggers, Web sites, and other 
online media. The government’s Internet censorship efforts ran the gamut from establishing 
new government agencies and regulations to technical control mechanisms and punishment, 
including imprisonment and even torture (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
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All commercial Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were required to connect to the 
Internet via the state-controlled Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI). All Internet 
traffic, therefore, ran through a government-controlled gateway. This centralization facilitated 
both censorship and control. In general, all ISPs needed to be approved by TCI and the 
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. In 2001, TCI established guidelines requiring that 
all ISPs had to filter any material that might be considered immoral or threatening to state 
security. This included filtering the Web pages of opposition groups (OpenNet Initiative, 
2005). Since 2001, Internet providers have been required to install filtering software 
(Proschofsky, 2009).  
The main targets of the filtering efforts were Web sites dealing with national issues, 
particularly those critical of the Iranian state, and especially those featuring local language 
(Persian and Farsi) content. The filtering software monitored both Web sites and e-mail 
messages. To sum up the government’s filtering program, all politically sensitive sites 
(including blogs) as well as sites including gay and lesbian content or information about 
women’s rights, were blocked. Iran had one of the “most sophisticated state-mandated 
filtering systems” (OpenNet Initiative, 2005, p. 3).  
Initially, Iran relied on SmartFilter, a commercial software product from the United 
States. SmartFilter blocked not only English language Web pages hosted overseas but also 
Web pages with local language content. Web pages hosted within Iran were also shut down, 
suspended, or filtered. But later Iran tried to eliminate its dependence on Western Web-
filtering technology. The government considered use of Western technologies a weakness, 
and even a potential threat to the Iranian Internet.  
A number of Iranian technology corporations therefore started developing filtering 
software (Rooz, 2008). Iranian technology enabled the government to search the Internet for 
specific keywords and questionable content it had defined internally. “With the emergence of 
this domestic technical capacity, Iran joins China as the only countries that aggressively filter 
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the Internet using their own technology” (OpenNet Initiative, 2009, p. 4). In addition to 
implementing sophisticated filtering mechanisms, the government established a blacklist of 
Web sites featuring questionable content (BBC News, 2003). Between 2004 and 2009, five 
million Web pages were reportedly blocked (Proschofsky, 2009). 
The Iranian government established various new agencies to administer its regulations 
and undertake its censorship efforts. The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCRC) 
passed filtering system decrees in 2001. The Committee in Charge of Determining 
Unauthorized Sites (CCDUS) outlined criteria for identifying unauthorized Web pages and 
blocking them when appropriate. The Information Technology Company of Iran (ITC) was 
responsible for filtering decisions. Finally, the Communication Infrastructure Company 
unified filtering policies nationwide (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). 
Governmental censorship for all media forms (online and offline) intensified just 
before the 2004 parliamentary elections. Reformist newspapers were closed, journalists were 
arrested, and several Web pages (including pro-reformist sites) were blocked. With the 
election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, censorship increased markedly. Reporters 
Without Frontiers (RSF) labeled Iran “an enemy of the Internet” (Reporters Sans Frontières, 
2009) and the OpenNet Initiative called Iran’s Internet censorship policies “pervasive” 
(OpenNet Initiative, 2005).  
In 2006, for example, the government set limits on Internet access speeds. According 
to this regulation, ISPs were prohibited from providing households and public Internet access 
points (cybercafes) with access speeds exceeding 128 kilobytes per second. This made 
downloading multimedia content cumbersome. While this measure may have helped prevent 
the viewing of criminal content such as child pornography, it naturally thwarted the viewing 
of neutral content such as international news as well. Only universities and private businesses 
were allowed to enjoy high-speed broadband Internet service. Both censorship efforts and 
civil opposition to those efforts escalated during and after the 2009 presidential election.  
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Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent president, faced several opponents in the 
presidential election that took place on June 12, 2009. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the reformist 
candidate, was the strongest opponent. Ahmadinejad won with 62.6 percent of the vote 
compared to Mousavi’s 33.8%.  
Mousavi and his followers challenged the results and accused the government of 
election fraud. Several censorship measures taken immediately before the election fueled the 
fraud allegations. Prior to the election, the Ahmadinejad government had issued an 
amendment to the Press Law aimed at applying Press Law rules to domestic news sites and 
Web pages. Personal Web pages and blogs fell under this ruling, thereby undermining 
freedom of speech on the Internet. Essentially, the amendment made it mandatory to obtain a 
license to produce Web pages. The result of this amendment was that “bloggers and online 
media sources would also be subject to the regulatory authority of the Press Supervisory 
Board under Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, which has the power to revoke 
licenses, ban publications, and refer complaints to a special Press Court” (OpenNet Initiative, 
2009, p. 5).  
Critics charged that Ahmadinejad had tried to diminish the online influence of 
political competitors (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). Online and mobile communication traffic 
was frequently blocked and monitored during this time, and several sites, including Google 
and Yahoo, were blocked, making e-mail service through them inaccessible. Additionally, 
several social networking platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were blocked in the spring 
of 2009 (Bozorgmehr, 2009; The Guardian, 2009). These services were particularly favored 
by reformists as platforms for political organizing and campaigning (Amnesty International, 
2009). Ahmadinejad and his government, however, denied blocking these sites. Yet other 
social networking Web sites, too, such as MySpace.com, Flickr.com, YouTube.com, and 
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Orkut.com, had reportedly been frequently blocked prior to the election (OpenNet Initiative, 
2009).  
In addition to Internet traffic blocking, the Iranian government increasingly monitored 
online text and e-mail communications before and after the election. The OpenNet Initiative 
reported that following their arrest, female activists were confronted with transcripts of their 
instant messaging communications (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). This indicated that the Iranian 
authorities possessed comprehensive monitoring tools that enabled comprehensive inspection 
of multiple forms of online communications. Observers have suggested that these monitoring 
activities might have been the reason for decreased Internet speeds prior to, during, and after 
the elections (Cellan-Jones, 2009). 
 
Civil Society’s Response: The Twitter Revolution 
Demonstrations, riots, and street battles between Mousavi followers and military 
groups followed the controversial election results. Mousavi followers used social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to organize demonstrations, mobilize protests against 
the government, and appeal to the public. In the Facebook group “Where is my vote,” some 
17,000 participants exchanged their views on the dubious Iranian presidential election.4 In 
addition to organizing demonstrations, university students used Twitter and the video 
platform YouTube to provide minute-by-minute updates on the latest developments in Tehran 
(Washington Times, 2009). Real-time Twitter messages and YouTube video clips enabled 
people around the world to view the riots and gain a basic understanding of the political 
situation in Iran. International interest was so intense that Twitter postponed its regular 
maintenance work to ensure that information flowed from Iran to the outside world (The 
Washington Post, 2009).  
The Iranian government reacted to the increased use of Twitter and other social media 
platforms by slowing Internet speeds and temporarily blocking Web sites (Rhoads et al., 
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2009). Along with Internet traffic blocking and monitoring, mobile communications traffic 
was constrained following the election. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that 
both mobile phone services and short message services (BBC News, 2009) had been 
intermittently interrupted in Iran (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2009).  
Despite governmental censorship efforts, the election protests continued into the 
summer of 2009. But the Iranian government’s monitoring capabilities enabled its 
representatives to interfere, block communications, and even identify and locate senders of 
specific messages. For example, several women rights activists were reportedly arrested at a 
secretly agreed-upon meeting place, indicating that their private communications had been 
intercepted (Lake, 2009).  
In short, monitoring capabilities made it possible for the government to locate and 
arrest dissidents. Once arrested, dissidents often became victims of torture and/or threats, 
including beatings, mistreatment, and forced confessions, according to Amnesty International 
reports (Amnesty International, 2009). Violent government action against dissidents, 
including harassment and persecution, had a noticeable effect: online activity by anti-
government activists declined in the late summer of 2009. Bloggers with national audiences 
who posted views critical of the government and the election results were arrested and beaten 
and their blogs vanished (Gross, 2009). Amnesty International reported that some of its 
former Iranian informants ceased all communications with them due to threats by military 
groups.  
As a result, the question of how the Iranian government managed to create such a 
sophisticated communications monitoring and censorship system drew increasingly sharp 
public attention.  
 
Worldwide Civil Reaction to NSN’s Transaction with Iran 
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The controversial election results, escalating protests and violence, and growing 
reports of Iranian censorship triggered speculation about how the Iranian government 
acquired such sophisticated monitoring capability.  Shortly after the election, the media 
reported that NSN had assisted the Iranian government in setting up a highly robust 
monitoring and censorship system. In particular, reports claimed that NSN’s technology 
enabled the Iranian government not only to monitor local voice telephone traffic, but also 
mobile data and Internet traffic, including so-called deep packet inspection.  
Deep packet inspection allows authorities to scan and search e-mail messages, Internet 
phone calls, and instant messaging traffic for specific keywords. The technology allows such 
data to be examined for keywords within milliseconds (Rhoads and Chao, 2009). According 
to media reports, the Iranian government had experimented with the technology in early 2009, 
but implemented it in full force following the election. In a Wall Street Journal article a 
network engineer stated that monitoring technology such as that provided by NSN enabled the 
Iranian government “to do very complex tracking on the network” (Rhoads and Chao, 2009).  
While news reports could not confirm that the Iranian government had in fact used 
NSN’s technology to monitor its citizens, civil and human rights groups consistently linked 
NSN to the oppressive Iranian regime. Human rights groups condemned business deals such 
as the one struck between NSN and the Iranian government as undermining freedom of 
speech and contributing to the suppression of dissent. Representatives of a number of civil 
groups called for boycotts of Nokia and Siemens products (Kamali Dehghan, 2009), and 
drove home their criticisms with techniques including “adbusting.”5  
For example, they mocked Nokia’s slogan of “connecting people” by promoting 
alternatives such as “Connecting Dictators,” “Disconnecting people,” or “Spying on People,” 
“Jailing People,” and “Shooting People.” Figure 1 provides examples of adbusting. Appendix 
A provides a brief overview of key events related to the 2009 Iranian presidential election. 
------------------------------------------ 
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Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
September, 2009: Nokia Siemens Networks Headquarters in Espoo, Finland 
Recalling the heated debate over NSN’s business dealings with the Iranian state, 
Beresford-Wylie wondered whether there had been any acceptable alternatives to his 
company’s decision to sell products and services to Iran’s government. True, filtering 
mechanisms in the wrong hands could have negative social consequences, but wasn’t it better 
to provide people with communication capabilities than with nothing at all? Besides, NSN 
was simply carrying out its business and obeying the law. Competition was tough.  
What’s more, in March of 2009 NSN had sold its Intelligent Solutions division — 
which handled monitoring centers and related software solutions — to German holding 
company Perusa Partners Fund LLP. Therefore the monitoring center business was no longer 
part of its business. Even though the decision had been made, Beresford-Wylie wondered 
whether NSN — or he — could have done things differently. 
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Notes 
1 On June 20, 2009 a student named Neda Agha-Soltan participated in protests in 
Tehran. During the demonstration Neda was shot and her death filmed by co-protesters. The 
film was soon uploaded on the video platform YouTube (www.youtube.com). As a result, 
Neda became known as a “symbol of rebellion in Iran” (Weissenstein and Johnson, 2009). 
 
2 The original text of the biography can be found online here: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080502141916/http://www.nokia.com/A4126338 (accessed 
Nov 2, 2010). 
 
3 More information about the standard bodies can be found on their respective Web 
sites: http://www.etsi.org; http://www.3gpp.org; and http://www.askcalea.net. 
 
4 The Facebook group can be viewed here: 
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=84334119822 (accessed Nov 3, 2009). 
 
5 Adbusting (also known as “subvertising” or “cultural jamming”) refers to the spoofing 
or parodying of corporate or political advertisements in order to present audiences with 
alternative views of the issue to which the original advertisement refers. For some more 
information on adbusting and its origins, see Chapter 12 in “No logo” by N. Klein.  
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Appendix A: Selected events surrounding the 2009 Iranian presidential election and post-
election riots 
Month Day Event 
June 12 Presidential election takes place.  
 
 13 Protests begin and continue throughout June. Riots between protestors 
and police officers escalate. Protesters are beaten and arrested. 
 
 14 Mousavi asks the Guardian Council to annul election. 
 
 14-17 Worldwide protests against the allegedly fraudulent election, erupt in 
London, New York, and elsewhere. 
 
 16 Mousavi demands new election. 
  The Iranian government restricts foreign media reports about riots. 
 
 19 Supreme Leader Khamenei warns protesters and urges them to stop. 
 
 20 Video of Neda’s death circulates worldwide. 
 
 21 Newsweek reporter arrested in Iran. 
 
 23 The Guardian Council rejects opposition demand for election 
annulment. 
  U.S. President Obama condemns violence against protesters. 
 
 24 Supreme leader Khamenei insists that election results are final. 
 
 26 The Guardian Council states that the 2009 presidential elections were 
“the healthiest since the revolution.” Senior cleric Khatami expects 
protestors to be punished “ruthlessly and savagely”. 
 
 28 Members of U.K. embassy in Iran are arrested for their involvement in 
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post-election riots. 
 
 29 The Guardian Council certifies election results. 
   
July 4 Some religious leaders call the election and the new government 
illegitimate. The split within the country deepens. 
 
 9 Protests resume after an 11-day quiet period. 
 
 17 Former president Rafsanjani criticizes the government’s handling of 
post-election unrest in the country. 
 
 25 Human rights organizations urge worldwide peaceful protests against 
the elections. 
 
 30 Riots erupt on the day of Neda’s funeral when hundreds of Mousavi 
supporters gather to mourn. Police officers force Mousavi to leave. 
 
August 5 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is sworn into office. 
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Appendix B: Teaching guidance 
Suggested questions and brief answers 
1. What might have been Beresford-Wylie’s perception of the business deal at the time the 
transaction took place in 2008?  
Please note that the case study takes a retrospective view. NSN concluded its 
transaction with the Iranian government in the summer of 2008. In 2009, as he 
prepared to leave the company, Beresford-Wylie was reflecting on his time as NSN’s 
CEO and reviewing the company’s dealings with the Iranian government.  
 
For this question, anything that happened in 2009 (elections, riots etc) should be 
ignored. Beresford-Wylie (and NSN generally) would not have known, or could not 
have reasonably been expected to know, that the company’s business relationship with 
Iran would be eventually criticized. For this question, focus student attention on 
managerial issues and on Beresford-Wylie personally, and how he might have 
perceived the business opportunity in 2008.  
 
Who is Beresford-Wylie?  
Beresford-Wylie is an experienced manager who held various senior positions at 
Nokia and other companies before becoming CEO of NSN. His background is likely 
to have exerted significant influence on how he perceived the situation in 2008. 
Beresford-Wylie might have looked at NSN’s business dealings with the Iranian 
government from the following perspectives/mindsets: 
1. Economic mindset: As the CEO of a multinational company, Beresford-
Wylie surely considers the economics of any transaction, especially 
considering the fierce competition NSN faced. Could competition have 
21 
justified the deal but narrowed Beresford-Wylie’s perception? The intensity of 
the competition might have led to a “get the deal whatever it takes” mentality.  
2. Compliance-mindset: As with a general analysis of economic conditions 
(such as competition), corporations routinely check to ensure their business 
activities are legal. As explained in the text, NSN regularly served government 
customers. Therefore Beresford-Wylie might not have given any additional 
thought to the decision as to whether or not to do business with the Iranian 
government (especially if we consider that Beresford-Wylie worked for 
governmental agencies himself before joining the private sector). 
3. Customer oriented mindset: As noted at the beginning of the case, 
Beresford-Wylie had worked closely and directly with customers. Hence, he  
was strongly oriented toward satisfying customer requests. This becomes clear 
if we look at NSN’s description of Beresford-Wylie (p. 4): he has a passion for 
customers and strives to make NSN a customer-centric enabler of 
communications services. This customer-oriented mindset may have been 
particularly strong considering that Beresford-Wylie had worked in the public 
sector (Australian government) before joining private industry. He therefore 
was likely to have perceived government agencies as ordinary customers rather 
than as entities to be regarded with some suspicion.  
 
Considering the above-mentioned mindsets, we might conclude that in 2008 
Beresford-Wylie viewed the transaction through a utilitarian lens. As mentioned in his 
biography (p. 4), Beresford-Wylie was a results-oriented business leader whose goal 
was to make NSN the world’s most visionary, customer-centric enabler of 
communication services. Doing business with the Iranian government had positive 
results: Strengthening NSN’s competitive position and satisfying a demanding 
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customer (with good prospects for further business). This brought NSN closer to its 
goal of becoming number one in its industry.  
 
2. What might have been Beresford-Wylie’s perception of the business deal in September 
2009, after the Iranian election? 
This question requires considering the 2009 elections and riots, events that might have 
changed Beresford-Wylie’s previous perceptions. How might the 2009 riots and civil 
unrest have changed Beresford-Wylie’s (utilitarian) view of the business deal?  
Beresford-Wylie might have continued supporting the business transaction by 
focusing on economics: after all, NSN was an economic, not a political actor. 
According to this view, it could ignore political issues when doing business.  
Yet Beresford-Wylie might also have asked himself whether good results always 
justify the means by which those results were obtained. Besides viewing the situation 
through a utilitarian lens, he might at least acknowledge a Kantian perspective of the 
situation, as the end of the case illustrates. The case demonstrates the limitations of 
utilitarianism (utility distribution, subjectivity, and problems of quantification). A 
Kantian approach, in contrast, stresses that results do not justify means.  
 
As indicated by the brief answers, the first two questions allow a detailed comparison 
of consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical theories.   
 
3. What does stakeholder analysis tell you about the stakeholders and their interests? 
Stakeholder analysis is a useful tool for acquiring a reasonable overview of the 
interests of all parties involved. A stakeholder is any actor who affects or is affected 
by a company’s activity. Depending on what was previously discussed about 
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stakeholder theory in class, this analysis could be a brief discussion or a detailed 
debate. Following are some suggestions for guiding the discussion: 
 
Customer (Iranian government): As the customer, the Iranian government was a 
key stakeholder that wanted to expand its wireless and mobile networks. Iran is a 
growth market and satisfying this customer might lead to future business 
opportunities.  
NSN shareholders: NSN shareholders expect the company to execute profitable 
business deals. They expect NSN and its senior management to make efficient 
economic decisions. 
Nokia and Siemens: NSN is a joint venture between mobile telephone manufacturer 
Nokia and electrical equipment giant Siemens. These two prominent companies are 
naturally interested in NSN doing well. Also, Nokia and Siemens want to avoid 
negative publicity surrounding their involvement in NSN. The adbusting examples in 
Figure 1 illustrate Nokia’s (and Siemens’) vulnerability. Hence, the two companies 
bear economic as well as reputational risk. 
Competitors: As mentioned in the text, the competition is fierce and NSN’s 
competitors were keen to win business.  
NSN employees: NSN’s employees are primarily interested in continued employment. 
This means that employees want NSN to perform well and earn a profit. For some 
employees, though, it might also be important that the company respect human rights. 
These employees may sense a dilemma between earning profits and remaining ethical.  
Iranian population: The Iranian population is also a stakeholder group which must be 
mentioned in the stakeholder analysis. Iranians are interested in access to the Internet 
and the latest communications technology (especially given the Iranian government’s 
censorship efforts). For Iranian citizens, communications technology can be a 
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blessing, but its misuse can also have negative effects, as illustrated by the riots and 
violence which followed the presidential election. A good tool in the wrong hands 
might not be good after all.  
Non-governmental organisations (Amnesty International etc.): The case briefly 
mentions that several human rights groups such as Amnesty International educated the 
public about censorship and human rights violations in Iran. These organisations were 
active before NSN started doing business in Iran. NGOs might be considered key 
stakeholders as they are sometimes the only public voice of minority groups or victims 
of human rights violations. Also, these groups can put considerable pressure on 
corporations and affect corporate reputations and even profits over the long run 
(examples include 1990s anti-Nike sentiment arising from conditions in Asian 
sweatshops). 
 
Besides identifying the stakeholders and their respective interests, students could also 
be asked to assess each stakeholder’s importance (in terms of legitimacy, power, and 
urgency).  
 
4. What are the arguments for and against doing business with the Iranian government? 
Key conflicts/dilemma addressed by the case: 
- Being profitable versus being moral 
- Responsibility for one’s own activities versus responsibility for what others do 
with one’s products 
- Being an economic versus political actor 
For the deal Against the deal 
Focus on the end result: Providing Internet 
access is a good thing from a utilitarian 
perspective. The Iranian population has 
Focus on the means: Following Kant’s duty 
ethics argues against the deal. The ends do 
not justify the means.  
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communication access, the Iranian 
government is a satisfied customer, and NSN 
makes a profit.   
Tool of democratization: In the long term, the 
technology might be advantageous for 
everyone. Despite censorship, people in Iran 
are better off with some Internet access. The 
power of communication technology is 
illustrated by the Green Twitter Revolution. It 
can foster communication.  
Tool of oppression: A good tool in the wrong 
hands might not be good after all. In the 
wrong hands, the tool can cause considerable 
harm: Dissidents were arrested, beaten and 
suppressed. Such technology can suppress 
rather than foster communication. 
 
Good product, bad use: It is not the product 
that is problematic but how it is used. The use 
or misuse of a product is not the responsibility 
of the seller. It is the user who is responsible.  
Corporate complicity: In recent years, 
corporations have increasingly been accused 
of complicity in human rights violations (e.g. 
Shell and the Ogoni crisis). Is a corporation 
responsible for ensuring proper use of the 
products it sells?  
Someone will do it: NSN could not have 
changed the situation. If NSN had not sold the 
technology, some Chinese company would 
have.  
Moral responsibility: This argument does not 
release NSN from moral responsibility. Iran 
was known for human rights violations and 
censorship.  
Legality: Lawful interception is legal and 
mandatory. This technology’s intention is 
good: protect society from illegal activities 
(terror, child pornography, etc).  
 
Legal does not mean moral: Business ethics 
deals with a grey area: just because an act is 
legal does not mean it is morally legitimate 
(examples are Apartheid or Yahoo in China). 
Classic work in business ethics argues for 
going beyond legal compliance. 
We could not have known: NSN did not know 
and could not have reasonably foreseen the 
risk of riots and civil unrest following the 
presidential elections.  
Duty to know: NSN failed to conduct a 
geopolitical risk analysis (no due diligence). 
The key question is: Could NSN truly not 
have understood the risks? Or did it simply 
fail to obtain all possible information? 
Human rights organizations have regularly 
reported on censorship and human rights 
violations in Iran. 
No political role: Corporations are economic 
actors. They do not have the standing or 
authority to evaluate governmental activities.  
Silent complicity: Operating with or under an 
oppressive regime can be interpreted as 
passively approving of the regime. 
Discrimination and negative business 
consequences: If NSN does not sell its 
product to Iran, it might trigger a debate about 
discrimination. If NSN does not do business 
with Iran, what would this mean for other 
potential customers? Can NSN do business 
with Nigeria? Myanmar? Iraq? Russia? 
China? The USA? 
Negative reputation consequences: There is 
growing pressure on companies that work 
with or under oppressive regimes (review 
cases filed under the Alien Torts Claims Act, 
for example). Also look at adbusting 
activities. 
Western imperialism. Why should the 
principles and norms of Western countries 
take precedence over those of other nations?  
Universality of human rights. The 
international community, including 
corporations, cannot ignore violations of 
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fundamental human rights. 
 
5. Does Nokia Siemens Networks bear responsibility for the events in Iran following the 
2009 election? What lessons can be learnt?  
 
This question builds on the previous one and asks students for their opinions. Is NSN 
responsible for the unintended side effects of its business operations?  
 
Yes, NSN bears responsibility for the events in Iran following the 2009 election:  
 NSN violated its duty to be informed  
 The political context of business transactions must not be ignored. Corporate 
activities are always embedded in a political context. Therefore, in contrast to 
what general management theory still assumes, economic and political aspects 
of a situation cannot be considered separately. NSN is an accomplice to Iran’s 
human rights violations. 
 
No, NSN is not responsible for human rights violations. This perspective can be 
supported by relying on an economic mindset. NSN itself did not hurt any activists. 
The Iranian regime committed the violations. We can also take a slightly different 
perspective here and argue that NSN was not responsible for the recent human rights 
violations following the 2009 election. The company might, however, be responsible 
for the efficiency of the violence. Iranian agencies might have punished dissidents and 
activists sooner or later anyway, but NSN’s technology facilitated the identification of 
dissidents and enabled the Iranian regime to punish them more quickly. Perhaps this is 
where NSN’s responsibility lay.  
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Lessons learnt:  
 Do not violate the duty to be informed. Thorough geopolitical risk analysis can 
enable companies to assess the potential side effects and consequences of their 
business activities. 
 Consult home governments, international institutions, and NGOs as part of this 
risk analysis. 
 
Courses 
The case study was written primarily for business ethics courses at all levels, undergraduate 
and graduate. The case has also been successfully used in executive MBA classes. In addition 
to business ethics classes, the case can be used in corporate social responsibility or decision-
making courses. Even though the case is not a classical decision-making exercise (the 
decision has already been made), discussing the protagonist’s reflections on his decision can 
create sensitivity among students regarding the various dimensions involved in making a 
decision. 
 
Case Objectives 
- Analyze the relevance of due diligence in corporate decision-making 
- Examine corporate complicity in human rights violations 
o The relevance of due diligence and corporate complicity in human rights 
violations is prevalent in practice and in theory. First of all, in recent years 
corporations have increasingly been accused of complicity in human rights 
violations (Shell in Nigeria, Coca-Cola in Colombia, Google and others in 
China, and so forth). Second, in 2005 the UN Human Rights Council 
appointed Professor Ruggie to propose a framework for measuring corporate 
human rights performance. In his reports, Ruggie examines the concept of 
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complicity and due diligence. For example, he elaborates on the corporation’s 
duty to become aware of human rights violations, prevent them, and mitigate 
related adverse effects. His proposed framework and suggestions will be 
reviewed in 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council. Third, scholars in 
business ethics and other disciplines increasingly include the complicity 
concept in their work (Clapham, 2006; Brenkert, 2009). Hence, the first two 
case objectives address issues in both practice and theory.  
- To examine the increasingly political role of corporations 
o This objective takes note of the growing literature on corporate political 
responsibility, which, in contrast to the economic paradigms presented by 
traditional management theory, asserts that economic and political domains 
cannot be cleanly separated (Sundaram et al., 2004). Some of the most 
influential contributions regarding corporate political responsibility have been 
advanced by Matten and Crane (2005) and Scherer and Palazzo (2007). As 
explained by Matten and Crane (2005), multinational corporations are 
increasingly taking on tasks that were traditionally performed by national 
governments. Multinational corporations, for example, are engaging in fighting 
injustice, repression, corruption, and other adverse social conditions (Misangyi 
et al., 2008), advocating for peace (Fort et al., 2004), or promoting public 
health (Margolis et al., 2003). This recent stream of corporate social 
responsibility-related research is promising and can add insights to the case 
discussion. 
- To analyze corporate challenges inherent in operating in or with oppressive regimes 
o This objective can be linked to classic ethical theories such as 
consequentialism and non-consequentialism. If we consider the discussion of 
complicity and due diligence, for instance, we can see parallels to non-
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consequentialist theories such as Kantian duty ethics (duty to know, be 
informed, treat people as ends in themselves ….). At the same time, corporate 
challenges related to operating in or with oppressive regimes can be analyzed 
from a consequentialist standpoint: aiming to achieve the greatest good for the 
greatest number (utilitarianism). Other classic ethical theories such as virtue 
ethics can also be used to analyze the case. In this case, the focus might be on 
the decision maker (Beresford-Wylie). Applying different ethical theories may 
lead to different results (legitimization or delegitimization of the business 
transaction). This should foster considerable discussion among students. 
 
Teaching the case 
The case can be discussed in one class period lasting 60 to 90 minutes. It is suggested that 
students read and prepare the case prior to class. Students could be asked to prepare a short, 
two-to-three page reflection paper summarizing the case and responding to the questions. If 
students are required to send the paper to the instructor before class, the instructor can include 
submitted material during class discussion. A suggested class outline is provided below: 
 
Introduction (10-15 minutes) 
The instructor might begin the class by asking students what they know about the 2009 
Iranian presidential election. This question launches the discussion and provides a review of 
some key facts about the election (events listed in Appendix A).  
 
Group discussion (30 minutes) 
Following this short introduction, the instructor could divide the class into several groups of 
four to six students each, depending on class size. Each group is then asked to discuss the case 
questions and select a spokesperson to summarize the group’s answers and present them to 
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the class. This format allows the students to exchange ideas and discuss the questions in 
detail. The instructor might go from group to group, listening to the debates and answering 
any questions that arise. 
 
Class discussion (30 minutes) 
Coming together again as a class, the instructor could ask group spokespersons to respond to 
the case questions in order, with teammates/classmates assisting/commenting as per the 
instructor’s preference. To facilitate the discussion, the instructor might summarize key points 
for each question on a whiteboard or blackboard as the students speak. This is especially 
useful for Question Four (moral arguments for and against the deal). Question Four and 
Question Five are the most provocative questions and considerable time should be allowed for 
their discussion. To stimulate the discussion, the instructor may want to cite phrases from 
student papers where appropriate. 
After discussing responses to Question Five, the instructor may want to cite similar cases of 
alleged corporate complicity in human rights violations, such as Shell’s Nigeria operations 
(Human Rights Watch, 1995), Google’s market presence in China (Brenkert, 2009), or the 
Killer Coke case (www.killercoke.org). The instructor may want to consider this option in 
light of student background or experience with relevant courses. The following is a brief 
discussion of parallels between the NSN case, the Shell/Ogoni case, and the Killer Coke case.  
 
Shell and the Ogoni Case 
In the 1990s, the Ogoni people in Nigeria fought for greater control over the natural resources 
on their lands, leading to violent conflict between their community and national armed 
security forces (Amnesty International, 2005). Because Shell was operating in the Nigerian 
region at the time, and some of its facilities were protected by national security forces, it soon 
found itself confronted with demands to investigate its possible complicity with human rights 
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violations in the Delta region (Amnesty International, 2005). When some key Ogoni activists 
were arrested, international organizations called on Shell to use its power (corporate presence 
in Nigeria) to intervene.  
 
Coca-Cola in Colombia (Killer Coke Case) 
Over the last 15 years, local and international NGOs have reported extreme violence against 
union activists in Colombia. Coca-Cola and some of its bottlers have been accused of hiring 
paramilitary forces to torture (and kill) union activists in Colombia. In 2001, NGOs and 
relatives of some victims filed a lawsuit against Coca-Cola under the Alien Torts Claims Act. 
This action was dismissed in 2006. 
 
Brief discussion 
While the NSN case deals with the side effects of product consumption, the Shell and Coca-
Cola cases deal instead with the side effects of production (conflicts with local communities 
and union rights). One interesting question to ask students might be whether corporations 
have more responsibility for the side effects of production or for the side effects of 
consumption. How far does corporate responsibility extend? Despite the slight difference 
(consumption versus production-related side effects) the three cases share a fundamental 
question: Is it legitimate to do business with or under an oppressive regime? 
The Shell Ogoni case is similar to the NSN case: Shell was doing business with an oppressive 
regime and did not engage in human rights violations itself, but was accused of complicity in 
such violations. Moreover, Shell may not have conducted a sufficient geopolitical risk 
analysis before starting to operate in Nigeria (failing in its duty to be informed).  
The Shell Ogoni case is particularly interesting because relatives of the executed activists 
filed a lawsuit under the Alien Torts Claims Act. This suit was settled in 2009. Coca-Cola was 
also sued under the Alien Torts Claims Act, but its case was dismissed in 2006. This raises a 
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question for NSN: Would a lawsuit under the Alien Torts Claims Act have led to a similar 
result? At the time the NSN case study was written, an Iranian activist was about to sue NSN 
(Nokia and Siemens) for complicity in his torture (Dehghan, 2010). How likely is it that a 
lawsuit against NSN (Nokia, Siemens) would be successful given the results of the Shell and 
Coca-Cola cases (one settled, one dismissed)?  
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Figure 1: Adbusting examples 
 
Source (from left to right):  
http://s3.causes.com/photos/RZ/Uf/HM/H1/x3/8T/Eh/0wJ.jpg  
http://islamtxt.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/nokia_jailing_09_11.jpg  
http://niacblog.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/nokia.jpg  
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